

JD.com (JD US)

Margin to reach the upward inflection point; initiate with BUY

- Premium brand image backed by superb quality control and powerful in-house supply-chain capability; JD.com (JD) secures a leading position in the online market sales of consumer electronics and home appliances.
- Manageable impact from coronavirus outbreak thanks to proprietary supply chain
- Margin expansion underway driven by improving operational efficiency and economies of scale
- Initiate BUY with TP of USD 49

A premium brand for online customers. In our view, JD's direct sales business model, superb quality control, and robust in-house logistics infrastructure are its core competitive edges. It enjoyed 54%/75%/88%/62%/61% market shares in online sales of mobile phones/notebook PC/desktop PC/digital camera/home appliance in 3Q19, and has successfully replicated its success in various F&B products.

Manageable impact from coronavirus outbreak. JD guided for at least 10% YoY revenue growth in 1Q20 amid coronavirus outbreak. In our view, such manageable impact could be attributed to its self-operated proprietary supply chain with high order fulfillment capability.

Jingxi – a rising star. In our view, its social ecommerce platform, Jingxi, which combines the Group's strengths in supply chain with its business model concisely tailored to consumers in lower-tier cities, has gained traction, helping penetrate further into lower-tier cities in coming years.

Margin expansion underway. The Group has been experiencing a margin expansion in recent quarters driven by improving economies of scale and logistic capacity utilization. We believe JD has passed its margin turnaround inflection point, similar to Amazon's situation several years ago, which implies significant rooms for further improvement in the medium term. We overall expect core net margin to improve to 2.3% in 2021E from 1.9% in 2019.

Initiate with BUY. We initiate **BUY** with a SOTP-based TP of USD 49. We consider JD as a quality play in the ecommerce sector.

Results and Valuation

	2018A	2019A	2020E	2021E
Revenue (RMB mn)	462,019	576,888	668,965	797,852
Chg (%, YoY)	27.5	24.9	16	19.3
Net profit (RMB mn)	-2,492	12,184	9,996	15,789
Chg (%, YoY)	-2,239.30	-588.8	-18	57.9
Core net profit (RMB mn)	3,460	10,750	13,049	18,627
Chg (%, YoY)	-30.4	210.7	21.4	42.7
Earnings per ADS (RMB)	-1.7	8.2	6.7	10.6
Chg (%, YoY)	-2,188.20	-580.3	-18	57.9
Core earnings per ADS (RMB)	2.4	7.2	8.8	12.6
Chg (%, YoY)	-30.4	204.9	21.4	42.7
Core P/E (x)	111.9	36.7	30.2	21.2
P/S (x)	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.5
ROAE (%)	-4.4	16.7	10.9	14.7
ROAA (%)	-1.3	5.2	3.5	4.9

1 ADS = 2 common shares

Source(s): Bloomberg, ABCI Securities estimates

Company Report

Initiation

Mar 13, 2020 Rating: BUY TP: USD 49

Analyst: Steve Chow Tel: (852) 2147 8809 stevechow@abci.com.hk

ADS price (USD)	38.26
Est. share price return	28.1%
Est. dividend yield	NA
Est. total return	28.1%
Previous Rating &TP	NA
Previous Report Date	NA

Source(s): Bloomberg, ABCI Securities

estimate

Key Data

Walmart

52Wk H/L(USD)	45.3/25.4
Issued shares (mn)	2,912
Market cap (USD mn)	55,707
Avg daily turnover (USD	654
mn)	
Major shareholder(s)	Voting right
Richard Liu	79.0%
Tencent	4.5%

Source(s): Bloomberg, HKEx, ABCI Securities

Share Performance (%)

	<u>Absolute</u>	Relative*
1-mth	-8.9	2.3
3-mth	12.5	19.7
6-mth	22.5	25.6

*Relative to MXCN

Source(s): Bloomberg, ABCI Securities

Share performance(USD)



Source(s): Bloomberg, ABCI Securities

2.5%



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A quality play in the ecommerce sector

A premium brand for online customer

We consider JD as a quality play in the ecommerce sector with strengths in its unique direct sales business model as well as an in-house powerful logistic infrastructure. On the other hand, major peers including Alibaba (BABA US) and Pinduoduo (PDD US) adopt an asset-light marketplace business model, which mainly co-operates with external partners and merchants for product sourcing and logistic.

In our view, JD's unique business model allow it to better quality assurance and services than other ecommerce platforms, helping the Group create a premium brand image among consumers.

Indeed, investors favor JD's business model over its peers in recent years. E.g., JD's share price has increased by 99.7% since end-2018, vs. 50.6% for Alibaba and 68.0% for Pinduoduo over the same period. In addition, since end-2019, JD's share price has increased by 18.6%, compared to the 2.7% and 0.3% drop for Alibaba and Pinduoduo.

Exhibit 1: Share price performance

	Share price performance	Share price performance
	since end-18	since end-19
Alibaba (BABA US)	50.6%	-2.7%
JD.com (JD US)	99.7%	18.6%
Pinduoduo (PDD US)	68.0%	-0.3%
Nasdaq 100	32.3%	-4.1%

^{*}Up to Mar 10, 2020

Source(s): Bloomberg, ABCI Securities; Remark: JD.com is a member stock of Nasdaq 100

Manageable impact from coronavirus outbreak


One recent example to illustrate JD's operational strength is it defensiveness against the impact from coronavirus, given the Group's latest guidance of at least a 10% YoY revenue growth in 1Q20. In our view, JD's relative resilience can be attributed to its direct sales model and in-house logistic system that enables a strong order fulfillment capability. Indeed, JD's resumed full operation quickly after the CNY, according to the management.


On the other hand, Alibaba hinted that its China retail marketplace (Taobao and Tmall) might experience negative revenue growth in 1Q20 as the supply chain was seriously disrupted after CNY, impacting its order fulfillment capability.

High growth in global standard

JD achieved a rapid growth over the past decade, with revenue rising by 196.6x in the past 10 years (2009-19), outperforming various global technology companies including Facebook, Amazon, Google, etc. On a 5-year horizon (2014-2019), JD's revenue increased by 4.0x, ranking the third among global technology peers.








Note: 2019 revenue/2009 revenue Source(s): Bloomberg, ABCI Securities

Exhibit 3: 5-year revenue growth (x)




Note: 2019 revenue /2014 revenue Source(s): Bloomberg, ABCI Securities

Overall, its unique business model has helped secure its position as the second largest ecommerce platform in China while competing with Alibaba (BABA US) and new entrants such as Pinduoduo (PDD US).

In 2019, the Group generated RMB2.1tr of Gross Merchandize Value (GMV). We estimate its online market share to be ~20% in 2019 vs. 63% for Alibaba and 8% for Pinduoduo.

Exhibit 4: Online sales market share (2019)



Source(s): Companies, ABCI Securities estimates



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In recent years, JD's GMV growth has outperformed the overall industry in recent years, while elasticity (JD's GMV growth/industry growth) remained at 1.16-1.35x during 2017-2019.

Exhibit 5: JD's GMV growth vs. industry growth





Exhibit 6: Elasticity analysis (JD's GMV growth/industry growth)



Source(s): ABCI Securities

Source(s): the Group, NBS

The Group had 362mn of active customers in 2019, up 18.6% YoY. In addition, customer growth rate has accelerated in recent quarters, driven by ongoing expansion into lower-tier cities, product expansion, and new business initiatives such as C2M products (more details below). In addition, average annual spending per customer increased from RMB 4.4K in 2017 to RMB 5.7K in 2019.

Exhibit 7: Annual active customer trend





Exhibit 8: Average annual spending per customer



Source(s): the Group, ABCI Securities

Source(s): the Group, ABCI Securities

Stronghold in consumer electronics and home appliances

The Group's forte is in the online sales of electronics and home appliance products, which accounted for 64% of its direct sales revenue in 2019. In our view, customers are more willing to purchase high-ticket price items like consumer electronics in an online platform with better quality and assurance such as JD.

According to CAMIR, JD enjoys a market share of 54% in online sales of mobile phone, doubling that of Tmall in 3Q19. In addition, JD has a dominant market share in the online sales of notebook PC (75%), desktop PC (88%), digital camera (62%), and home appliance (61%) in 3Q19.

Exhibit 9: Market share in China's online sales of home appliance (3Q19)






Exhibit 10: Market share in China's online sales of mobile phone (3Q19)



Source(s): CAMIR, ABCI Securities

Source(s): CAMIR, ABCI Securities

Exhibit 11: JD's online market share for other consumer electronic products (3Q19)




Source(s): CAMIR, ABCI Securities

JD's electronic and home appliances online sales have exceeded Suning's retail revenue (online and offline) over the past few years. In our view, this scale benefit has helped JD, which adopts a direct sales model with its own inventories, to negotiate with suppliers to lower purchase cost, which in turn enhances its price competitive edge.

On the other hand, Alibaba and Pinduoduo, which adopts a marketplace model with no self-owned inventories, need to rely on individual merchants (generally smaller scale) to secure low-cost products and may provide heavy subsidies to merchants during the promotion period.



Exhibit 12: JD's consumer electronics & home appliances revenues vs. Suning's retail revenue



Source(s): Companies, ABCI Securities


Ongoing product expansion


In recent years, the Group has been leveraging its premium brand image for other product categories. As a result, the contribution of general merchandize (such as apparel, food, etc.) has been increasing gradually and accounted for 36% of product revenue in 2019 vs. 29% in 2017.

This strategy has achieved success in some categories. JD's market shares of online sales of infant formula milk powder, cooking oil, and Chinese white wine in 3Q19 were 58%/51%/52%, according to CAMIR.

Exhibit 13: JD's market share in China's online sales of home cooking oil (3Q19)

Exhibit 14: JD's market share in China's the online sales of Chinese white wine (3Q19)






Source(s): CAMIR, ABCI Securities

Source(s): CAMIR, ABCI Securities



Exhibit 15: JD's market share in in China's online sales of infant formula milk powder (3Q19)




Source(s): CAMIR, ABCI Securities

In addition to direct sales, the Group has also broadened its product offerings through ongoing expansion of its marketplace with over 220,000 merchants, which include international luxury brands such as Prada, Miu Miu, DKNY, Tissot, ORIS, etc. This has led to increases in service revenue, including those from the marketplace-related services, in recent years.


In addition, the Group has leveraged its AI capabilities and dataset to provide a variety of marketing services to merchants, such as targeted product recommendations.

Exhibit 16: Revenue mix by product categories



Source(s): the Group , ABCI Securities

Exhibit 17: Revenue mix - product vs. service



Source(s): the Group , ABCI Securities



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Product differentiation through unique consumer insight

The Group has been utilizing its data analyzing capabilities to gain consumer insight. It is helping brands tailor its products to match consumers' demands via its recent Consumer to Manufacturer (C2M) initiatives. Overall, this can shorten the product development cycle and lead time to consumers.

Currently, the Group has affiliated with over 140 appliances brands to innovate new products. E.g., the Group has partnered with TCL to launch three new customized smart appliances and Nestle on two C2M products.

In our view, this helps the Group offer differentiated products closely matching consumers' need, allowing it to stand out from other ecommerce platforms.

New social ecommerce platform, Jingxi (京喜), to tap into demand in lower-tier cities


In Sep 2019, the Group launched a social ecommerce platform, Jingxi, which is targeting at lower-tier cities. Overall, Jingxi connects consumers and manufactures via social media platforms and Jingxi app to enable consumers to communicate directly with manufacturers to explore value-for-money products.

E.g. it offers flash sale deals and items at a bargain price. Consumers could enjoy steep discounts either when they share the link info of an item with their friends, or by joining ongoing group-buying deals on the app. More importantly, it has partnered with Tencent to secure WeChat's first-level entry point to leverage the latter's traffic.

During the Singles Day promotion season in Nov 2019, about 75% of Jingxi's new users came from lower-tier cities.

In our view, this is similar to Pinduoduo's business model that enjoys a huge success in lower-tier cities. As a result, this new initiative, which combines the Group's premium brand image and the right business model more concisely tailored to consumers in lower-tier cities, would allow the Group to compete with Pinduoduo more effectively, in our view. Currently, over 70% of JD's new users are from lower-tier cities.









JD Logistics - the crown jewel

Supply-chain capability is one of the Group's greatest assets. JD has adopted a unique business model to build and operate its own warehouses and logistics system since the early days of operation.

Currently, the Group, through its logistics arm JD Logistics, operates one of most advanced nationwide warehouse and logistic system in China with over 650 warehouses totaling ~16mn sqm GFA. Supported by AI-driven technology, the Group is able to deliver about 90% of its direct sales orders within 24 hours in China.

Leveraging JD's advanced technology and logistic expertise, JD Logistics was established in Apr 2017 to provide integrated supply chain and logistic services. In Feb 2018, JD Logistics raised USD 2.5bn from third-party investors by selling a 19% stake. As a result, JD's stake in JD Logistics was reduced to 81%.

In our view, one of JD's strength is delivery speed. It has introduced the "211" program since 2010 that guarantees orders received before 11am will be delivered on the same day, and orders received before 11pm will be delivered by 3pm on the following day. In addition, it also provides scheduled delivery services in some cities, which allow consumers to choose a convenient two-hour delivery window to receive their goods.


JD Logistics has launched the "Flash Delivery" initiative in 2Q18, offering delivery time ranging from several minutes to about one hour for selected merchandizes in selected areas.


JD Logistics also introduced its new cold-chain service recently by utilizing the idle capacity in the industry. The initiative has attracted the American brand Dairy Queen to employ its services for ice cream products. JD Logistics is also the exclusive logistic service used by China CITIC Bank for delivery of bonus gifts to bank customers.

Currently, external revenue accounted for about 40% of JD Logistics' total revenue.

The success of JD Logistics helped raise the fulfilled gross margin (gross profit minus fulfillment expenses/revenue) by 0.9ppt to 8.2% in 2019, while gross margin improved by 0.3ppt to 14.6% during the same period. Increase in cost efficiency of logistic service has helped lower the fulfillment-to-revenue ratio, which in turn elevate the fulfilled gross margin.







Source(s): the Group, ABCI Securities

Unlocking property value with property management fund.

In 2018, JD established a property management group, or JDPM, which owns, develops and manages its logistics facilities and other real estate properties. In Feb 2019, JDPM established the JD Logistics Properties Core Fund (JD LPC Fund) with Singapore's sovereign wealth fund, GIC, for a total committed capital of over RMB 4.8bn. JD serves as the general partner and has committed 20% of the total capital while GIC has taken up the remaining 80%.

In addition, in Feb2019, JD entered into a definitive agreement with JD LPC Fund, where JD will dispose of certain logistics facilities to JD LPC Fund for a total gross asset value of RMB 10.9bn. Subsequent to the disposal, JD will lease back these facilities for operational purposes. As a result, JD recorded RMB 3.9bn in gains of sales of properties in 2019. In our view, such sales and leaseback transaction indicates that JD might want to adopt a more asset light approach to boost returns.

Currently, JD Property manages properties with a total GFA of over 10mn sqm.

Strategic partnership with Tencent (700 HK)

Tencent has been JD's major strategic partnership since 2014. As part of the strategic partnership, Tencent agrees to offer JD Level 1 access points in its mobile apps Weixin and Mobile QQ and provide traffic and other support from other key platforms to JD.

Overall, Level 1 access points refer to entries and links that Tencent users can directly access on the interfaces that will launch after one click on the home interface on Tencent's mobile apps. As a result, JD could leverage on Tencent's massive user base.

Other strategic partnerships/business initiatives

In addition to above, JD also has various strategic partnerships/business initiatives. Overall, these serve as part of JD's ecosystem with various synergies. Please refer to the following table for more details.



Exhibit 21: JD's cooperation with other companies

Partners	Detail
Partnership with Walmart (WMT US)	In June 2016, JD entered into strategic partnership with Walmart. As of Feb 28, 2019, Walmart held Class A ordinary shares representing ~9.9% stakes.
	As part of the strategic alliance with Walmart, JD acquired ownership of the Yihaodian online marketplace platform. JD has collaborated with Walmart on e-commerce, including launching Sam's Club Flagship Store and Walmart China Flagship Store on JD.com, as well as Sam's Club Global Flagship Store, Walmart Global Flagship Store, and ASDA Flagship Store on JD Worldwide. JD also provides a one-hour delivery service from Walmart Stores in select cities through the JD Daojia app. The two companies also leverage one another's supply chain to increase product selection for customers across China.
Partnership with Google (GOOGL US)	In June 2018, Google invested USD550 m in JD and the two companies will work together to explore a broad range of possibilities, leveraging JD's supply chain and logistics expertise and Google's technology strengths. In early 2019, JD joined Google Shopping to offer a selection of high-quality products to consumers in the US
Bitauto (BITA US)	JD held about 26% stakes in Bitauto, a US-listed online platform for automotive industry
Yixin (2858 HK)	JD held about 11% stakes in Yinxin, a HK-listed subsidiary of Bitauto primarily engaged in ecommerce- related automotive financing platform business
Tuniu (TOUR US)	JD held about 20.4% stakes in Tuniu, a US-listed online travel platform. JD's leisure travel channel is currently operated by Tuniu
Yonghui (601933 CH)	JD held about 12% stakes in Yonghui, a major supermarket chain in China. The two companies have formed a strategic partnership to strengthen supply chain management capability primarily through joint procurement, and explore development opportunities in online-to-offline initiatives
Dada	JD held about 47.5% stakes in Dada, China's largest crowdsourcing delivery company
	As of Dec 31, 2018, its joint venture, Dada-JD Daojia, had partnered with more than 100,000 stores from leading supermarket brands, including Walmart, Yonghui, Carrefour and CR Vanguard, by leveraging Dada's crowd-sourcing delivery network
	Dada-JD Daojia is China's leading on-demand logistics and omni-channel e-commerce platform
China Unicom (600050 CH)	In Aug 2017, JD entered into a conditional share subscription agreement with China Unicom, a Chinese telecommunications operator in relation to its investment of ~RMB 5bn. Concurrently, JD also entered into a strategic business cooperation agreement with China Unicom
VIP shop (VIPS US)	JD held about 7.2% stakes in VIP shop, an online discount retailer in China
Wanda Commercial Properties	JD held about 2% stakes in Wanda, a leading developer, owner and operator of commercial properties in China

Source(s): Companies, ABCI Securities



Peer comparison


Comparing with major peers including Alibaba and Pinduoduo, we estimate that JD's annual spending per customer was ~RMB 5.8K in 2019, lower than ~RMB9.2K for Alibaba but significantly higher than ~RMB 1.7K for Pinduoduo.

In our view, JD's lower annual spending per customer than Alibaba could be due to its narrower product range constrained by direct sales business model. On this front, we believe JD's ongoing expansion of its marketplace business and C2M initiatives could alleviate this weakness gradually.

On the other hand, its annual spending per customer is significantly higher than that of Pinduoduo, implying that its customers are ones with higher purchasing power and strong loyalty.


In terms of customer size, JD is lagging behind its competitors but we believe it could party due to the fact that Group has been focusing more on quality growth in the past. Having said that, we believe its recent new business initiative, Jingxi, could help expand its customer base especially in lower-tier cities going forward.

Exhibit 22: Annual active customers (2019)



Source(s): Companies, ABCI Securities

Exhibit 23: Annual spending per customer (2019)



Source(s): ABCI Securities estimates

At the first glance, JD generated RMB 577bn in revenue in 2019, higher than that of Alibaba and Pinduoduo - but this doesn't reflect the true picture as JD adopted direct-sales business so it recognizes direct-sales GMV as revenue, while Alibaba and Pinduoduo only recognizes sales commission as revenue with their marketplace model.

Hence, their core net profit sizes would be a better benchmark for comparison. In 2019, JD generated RMB 10.8bn core net profit vs. RMB 138.7bn for Alibaba and RMB 4.3bn core net losses for Pinduoduo. In our view, although JD's profit size is still significantly lower than that of Alibaba, its business operation is more sustainable than Pinduoduo, which is still suffering from meaningful losses at the moment.

In terms of margins, JD's core net margin was 2.3% in 2019, significantly lower than that of Alibaba. In our view, this could be attributed to JD direct sales business model and in-house logistics facilities, which bear inventory and logistic costs. On the other hand, Alibaba adopts an asset-light business model conducive to a higher core net margin



Exhibit 24: Business comparison

	JD.com	Alibaba	Pinduoduo	
Direct sales	Direct sales business sourced products from over 19K supplies at end-2018	NA	NA	
Online marketplace	Over 270,000 merchants at end-2019,	Taobao and Tmall had over 2bn product and service listings at Mar, 2019. As of Mar 31, 2019, there were over 190,000 brands and merchants on Tmall, including 77% of the consumer brands ranked in the Forbes Top 100 World's Most Valuable Brands for 2019.	3.6mn active merchants in 2018 "team purchase" model to allow customers to purchase products at low prices	
Omni-channel initiatives	JD Daojia –Online-to-offline supermarket platform 7FRESH- 24/7 fresh food supermarket SEVEN FUN- lifestyle space in Beijing to provide meal and leisure options JD E-SPACE – a 50K sqm experience store in Chongqing with innovative electronics and smart products Partnership with Walmart	Freshippo –grocery retail chain Partnership with various offline retailers including SunArt, Starbuck, Suning, Intime, Lianhua Supermarket, Red Staf Macalline, etc on omni-channel initiatives	NA	
Logistics network	Self-owned logistics network –JD Logistics At end-2019, JD Logistics operated over 700 warehouses, covering GFA of approximately 16.9m sqm	In FY3/19, Cainiao Network's 15 strategic logistic partners employed over 1.6 mn delivery personnel in more than 700 cities and 31 provinces in China. Collectively, these partners operate more than 190,000 hubs and sorting stations and delivered 25.1 bn packages in FY3/19.	External logistic partners	
Fintech	JD Digit (formerly JD Finance). Potential conversion into 40% of JD Digit's equity interest in the future, subject to regulatory approval	Ant Financial (33% stake)	NA	

Source(s): Companies, ABCI Securities



Exhibit 25: Financial comparison (2019)

		Alibaba			JD			Pinduoduo	
	2018	2019	YoY	2018	2019	YoY	2018	2019	YoY
Annual active user (mn) (period end)	636	711	11.8%	305	362	18.6%	419	585	39.7%
Revenue (RMB mn)	345,278	488,895	41.6%	462,019	576,888	24.9%	13,120	30,142	129.7%
Gross profit (RMB mn)	161,455	223,420	38.4%	65,953	84,421	28.0%	10,215	23,803	133.0%
Operating profit (RMB mn)	57,540	93,064	61.7%	-2,619	8,994	NA	-10,799	-8,538	-20.9%
Core net profit (RMB mn)	93,243	138,740	48.8%	3,460	10,750	211.0%	-3,456	-4,266	23.4%
Gross margin	46.8%	45.7%		14.3%	14.6%		77.9%	79.0%	
Operating margin	16.7%	19.0%		-0.6%	1.6%		-82.3%	-28.3%	
Core net margin	27.0%	28.4%		0.7%	1.9%		-26.3%	-14.2%	

Source(s): Companies, ABCI Securities

Exhibit 26: Financial comparison (2018)

	Alibaba			JD		Pinduoduo			
	FY3/18	FY3/19	YoY	2017	2018	YoY	2017	2018	YoY
Annual active user (mn)	552	654	18.5%	293	305	4.4%	245	419	71.0%
GMV (RMB bn)	4820	5727	18.6%	1,295	1,677	29.5%	141	472	234.0%
Annual spending per user (RMB)	8,732	8,742	0.1%	4,426	5,492	24.1%	576	1,126	95.3%
Revenue (RMB mn)	250,266	376,844	50.6%	362332	462,019	27.5%	1744	13,120	652.3%
Gross profit (RMB mn)	143,222	169,915	18.6%	50,815	65,953	29.8%	1021	10,215	900.5%
Operating profit (RMB mn)	69,314	57,084	-17.6%	-835	-2,619	213.8%	-596	-10,799	1711.9%
Core net profit (RMB mn)	85,766	100,731	17.4%	4,968	3,460	-30.4%	-373	-3,456	826.5%
Gross margin	57.2%	45.1%		14.0%	14.3%		58.5%	77.9%	
Operating margin	27.7%	15.1%		-0.2%	-0.6%		-34.2%	-82.3%	
Core net margin	34.3%	26.7%		1.4%	0.7%		-21.4%	-26.3%	

Source(s): Companies, ABCI Securities

Business model comparison

Overall, there are two major business models for online e-commerce platforms in-house and co-ops. In our view, each business model has its pros and cons. The decision to adopt which model is dependent on one's business strategies.

Co-ops business model: Alibaba and Pinduoduo operate online marketplaces and charge commission on merchants' sales. They also mainly rely on third-party logistics companies for product delivery.

In theory, this model requires less fixed-asset investments and working capital. In addition, product and geographical expansion are also easier as platforms can leverage merchants' product sourcing capabilities and logistic partners' logistic network. However, quality control is more difficult due to multiple parties involved in the supply chain, which will affect customer loyalty.

In-house business model: JD, with its own product inventories and logistic network, is the only major online ecommerce platform adopting an in-house business model.

In theory, this business model, with more control on product quality and supply chain, could potentially lead to better assurance and customer loyalty. The drawback is that this model usually requires hefty early-stage investments, which could impact a company's profitability in early years.

Exhibit 27: In-house vs. Co-ops -theoretical pros and cons

	In-house	Со-ор
Examples	JD	Alibaba, Pinduoduo
Business model	Direct sales	Marketplace
Inventories	Self-owned inventories	Inventories owned by merchants
Logistics network	Self-built logistics network	Third party logistics partners
Product expansion	Harder as platforms need to source new product by itself	Easier as platforms can leverage on merchants' product sourcing capabilities
Geographical expansion	Harder due to the need to establish logistic infrastructure	Generally easier, as platform can leverage on logistic partners' network
Quality assurance	Easier	More difficult due to more parties involved and less control on external parties
Margins	Potentially lower due to higher fixed cost and product cost	Potentially higher as platforms mainly charge sales commission with no inventory cost.
Working capital requirement	Higher	Lower

Source(s): ABCI Securities

DuPont analysis

We conduct a DuPont analysis to study the ROA composition among the three major online ecommerce platforms, Alibaba, JD, and Pinduoduo.

To recap, under the DuPont model:

Return on average asset (ROA) = Core net margin (i.e. core net profit/revenue) x Asset turnover (i.e. revenue/Average total asset).

Having said that, under JD's direct sales business model, it recognizes the direct-sale GMV as revenue, while Alibaba and Pinduoduo only recognizes sales commission as revenue (which is only a small % of GMV) under their marketplace model. As a result, the conventional DuPont formula might not be entirely applicable in this case, in our view.

To account for their accounting treatment difference, we adjust the DuPont formula by replacing revenue with GMV in the equation. So, the revised formula becomes:

Return on average asset (ROA) = (Core net profit/GMV) x (GMV/average total asset)

Alibaba: Alibaba's ROA is the highest among its major peers. In our view, this is mainly driven by its high core net profit/GMV ratio, which could be party attributed to its co-op business model that does not bear inventory and logistic cost. This is despite the fact that its GMV-to-average total asset ratio is the lowest among the three.

JD: JD's ROA was ranked the second (4.6% in 2019). In our view, the main drag is its low core net profit/GMV ratio of 0.5%, which is related to its inventory and logistic cost. On a positive note, its GMV-to-average total asset ratio is higher than that of Alibaba, implying more effective use of asset to generate GMV.

Pinduoduo: Pinduoduo is still loss-making with a negative ROA. Its negative core net margin/GMV ratio is mainly due to its high marketing and selling expenses equivalent to 90% of revenue and 114% of gross profit in 2019. Such high expenses are partially caused by the support given to merchants' price promotion. In our view, this subsidy-driven price promotion strategy has led to superior GMV-to-average total asset ratio (16.9x in 2019) but at the expense of overall profitability.

Exhibit 28: ROA analysis (2019)*

	Core net profit/GMV (A)	GMV/average total asset (B)	ROA (AxB)
Alibaba	2.3%	5.0	11.6%
JD	0.5%	8.9	4.6%
Pinduoduo	-0.4%	16.9	-7.2%

*FY3/20E for Alibaba Source(s): ABCI Securities



Industry trends

Overall, China's online sales growth has turned steadier after years of development. According to NBS, online sales of physical goods grew by 19.5% YoY in 2019 and accounted for 20.7% of total retail sales in 2019.

Looking forward, we expect China retail sales growth to slow to 7.2% YoY in 2020E on the coronavirus situation. For 2021E, we expect the figure to improve on the low base in 2020E and rebound to 7.5% YoY.

On a positive note, the recent virus outbreak has prompted more consumers to utilize online shopping, especially for groceries and good products, due to closure of physical shops and cut-off in local transportation. In our view, such change in consumer behavior could benefit the ecommerce industry as a whole in the long run.

For online sales of physical goods, we expect the penetration rate to increase to 25.4% in 2021E versus 20.7% in 2019, which implies an 18.8% CAGR of online sales growth rate (physical goods) in 2020-2021E.

Exhibit 29: China's online sales growth forecast (RMB bn)


	2018	2019	2020E	2021E
Total retail sales	38,099	41,165	44,129	47,438
YoY	9.0%	8.0%	7.2%	7.5%
Online sales	9,006	10,632	12,369	14,459
YoY	23.9%	16.5%	16.3%	16.9%
% of total retail sales	23.6%	25.8%	28.0%	30.5%
Online sales -physical goods	7,020	8,524	10,108	12,029
YoY	25.4%	19.5%	18.6%	19.0%
% of total retail sales	18.4%	20.7%	22.9%	25.4%


Source(s): NBS, ABCI Securities estimates

In recent years, we have seen emerging trends in the ecommerce sector that are benefiting players with strengths in specific areas.

Food products: Overall, food products achieved an online sales growth of 30.9% YoY in 2019, higher than 15.4% and 19.8% YoY for apparel and grocery products, according to NBS. In our view, this is partly driven by ongoing improvement in logistic supply chain, especially the same-day delivery and cold-chain service.









Source(s): NBS, ABCI Securities

Lower-tier cities: Overall, major ecommerce platform have been focusing on lower-tier cities in recent years. About 70% of new customers of Alibaba and JD are from lower tier cities. There were about 1bn mobile shopping users in Sep 2019, according to Questmoible, in which about 53% of users are from lower tier cities (tier-3 and below).





Source(s): Questmobile, ABCI Securities

Social ecommerce: Social ecommerce, which leverages social network such as WeChat to allow users to share product information with friends, has become increasingly popular. Consumers could enjoy steep discounts when they share an item to their friends, or by joining an ongoing group-buying deals on the app.

Also, more online brands/online platforms partners with celebrities or internet KOLs (Key Opinion Leader) to offer live videos or short videos to introduce products. E.g., Austin Li (李佳琦), a male KOL famous for selling lipsticks and other cosmetic products in his live program, has over 50mn fans. Another ecommerce KOL, Viya (薇娅), had over 30mn customer views for her live programs in the recent Nov 11 festival. She has also once achieved a record over RMB 300mn daily sales during the Nov 11 festival in 2018.



Financial analysis

For 2019-2021E, we expect GMV to grow by 16% CAGR to RMB 2.8tr by 2021E, driven by the growing number of active users and their spending.

Annual active customer: the Group had 362mn of annual active customers at end-2019. We see significant room for improvement as it is still much lower than 711mn for Alibaba (end-2019) and 585mn for Pinduoduo (end- 2019). The Group has seen good progress in penetrating into lower-tier cities, as illustrated by the 10%/19% YoY user growth in 3Q19/4Q19 vs. 3%/2% growth in 1Q19/2Q19. Looking forward, we expect the no. of active customers to reach 438mn by 2021E.

Annual spending per active customer: Annual spending per active customer has seen a growing trend in recent years, reaching RMB 5.8K in 2019. Having said that, it is still lower than RMB 9.2K for Alibaba. We expect the figure to increase further to RMB 6.4K in 2021E driven by ongoing improvement in product selection and user experience.

Exhibit 32: Major assumptions

	2017	2018	2019	2020E	2021E
Annual active customer account (mn)	293	305	362	398	438
GMV (RMB bn)	1,295	1,677	2,085	2,411	2,785
Annual spending per active customer (RMB)	4,426	5,492	5,761	6,055	6,358

Source(s): the Group , ABCI Securities estimates


Overall, we expect revenue to increase at 18% CAGR in 2019-2021E to RMB 798bn by 2021E, propelled by growing GMV and ongoing expansion of new businesses including the logistics. In particular, we expect logistics and other service revenue to grow at 45% CAGR in 2019-21E.

Exhibit 33: GMV outlook



Source(s): the Group , ABCI Securities estimates

Exhibit 34: Revenue outlook




Source(s): the Group , ABCI Securities estimates




In terms of business mix, product revenue (direct sales revenue) accounted for 89% of total in 2019, while service revenue accounted for the remaining 11%. We expect share of service revenue to increase to 14% by 2021E.

Net product revenue (direct sales): For JD's direct sales business, we expect direct sales revenue to grow to RMB 688bn in 2021E vs. RMB 511bn in 2019, implying a CAGR over 16% in 2019-2021E. In our view, this is mainly driven by general merchandize products given the Group's ongoing product expansion effort inot the category. This was illustrated by increasing sales mix of general merchandize products (as a percentage of net product revenue) in recent years, as shown in Exhibit 35.

Net service revenue (marketplace, advertising, logistics, other services): We expect net service revenue to grow at 29% CAGR in 2019-2021E. In particular, we expect logistics and other services revenue to increase at 45% CAGR during the period, as JD Logistics continues to launch new services such as cold-chain and acquire external customers. As a result, we expect service revenue to account for 14% of total revenue in 2021E vs. 11% in 2019.





Source(s): the Group , ABCI Securities estimates

Source(s): the Group , ABCI Securities estimates


Exhibit 37: Revenue forecasts (RMB mn)

	2017	2018	2019	2020E	2021E
Electronics and home appliance	236,269	280,059	328,703	354,999	408,249
General merchandize	95,555	136,050	182,031	227,538	279,872
Net product revenue	331,824	416,109	510,734	582,537	688,121
Marketplace and advertising	25,391	33,532	42,680	51,216	60,435
Logistics and other service	5,116	12,379	23,474	35,211	49,295
Net service revenue	30,508	45,911	66,154	86,427	109,730
Total revenue	362,332	462,019	576,888	668,964	797,851

Source(s): the Group , ABCI Securities estimates



The Group's margins have been increasing in recent years, with improvement seen in both the core JD Mall business and new businesses such as logistics, technology, etc. Operating margins of JD Mall and new businesses improved to 2.5% and -20.5% in 2019 vs. 1.4% and -34.4% in 2017 respectively. The improved profitability is driven by ongoing cost control, economies of scale in new businesses, enhanced logistic capacity utilization, and higher staff productivity.



Source(s): the Group, ABCI Securities

Looking forward, we expect the margins to improve further.

Gross margin: Gross margin has improved to 14.6% in 2019 vs. 14.0% in 2017. Looking forward, we expect it to improve further to 15.1% by 2021E driven by 1) product expansion into general merchandise products, which has a higher gross margin than consumer electronics products; 2) Improving contribution from service revenue, which has a higher gross margin than direct sales business.

Fulfillment expanse: Non-GAAP fulfillment expenses/sales ratio has improved to 6.3% in 2019 vs. 7.0% in 2017 driven by economies of scale and higher operation efficiency. We expect the ratio to improve further to 6.1% by 2021E driven by as JD Logistics' scale continues to expand.

Marketing expenses: Non-GAAP marketing expenses/sales ratio was 3.7% in 2019 vs. 3.9% in 2018. We expect this ratio to stay flat in 2020-2021E.

Technology & content expenses: Non-GAAP Technology & content expenses /sales ratio was 2.3% in 2019 vs. 2.4% in 2018. We expect this ratio to improve slightly in 2020-2021E on economies of scale. Having said that, we notice that JD's R&D/revenue ratio is significantly lower those of Alibaba and Pinduoduo, which ranged from 8.5-10% in recent years.

Other general & admin expenses: We expect non-GAAP G&A expense/sales ratio to improve to 0.4% in 2021E vs. 0.6% in 2019 driven by improving economies of scale.



Exhibit 39: Non-GAAP cost trend (RMB mn)


1,490 5,275 3,560 5,927 2,387	395,994 31,423 17,815 10,883	492,385 36,363 21,338 13,180	568,620 41,476 24,752	2021E 677,376 48,669 28,723
5,275 3,560 5,927	31,423 17,815 10,883	36,363 21,338	41,476 24,752	48,669
5,275 3,560 5,927	31,423 17,815 10,883	36,363 21,338	41,476 24,752	48,669
3,560 5,927	17,815 10,883	21,338	24,752	·
5,927	10,883			28,723
		13,180	11717	
2,387	0.000		14,717	16,755
	3,036	3,609	3,345	3,191
3,639	459,151	566,874	652,909	774,714
6.0%	85.7%	85.4%	85.0%	84.9%
7.0%	6.8%	6.3%	6.2%	6.1%
3.7%	3.9%	3.7%	3.7%	3.6%
1.6%	2.4%	2.3%	2.2%	2.1%
0.7%	0.7%	0.6%	0.5%	0.4%
9.0%	99.4%	98.3%	97.6%	97.1%
	6.0% 7.0% 3.7% 1.6% 0.7%	6.0% 85.7% 7.0% 6.8% 3.7% 3.9% 1.6% 2.4% 0.7% 0.7%	6.0% 85.7% 85.4% 7.0% 6.8% 6.3% 3.7% 3.9% 3.7% 1.6% 2.4% 2.3% 0.7% 0.6%	6.0% 85.7% 85.4% 85.0% 7.0% 6.8% 6.3% 6.2% 3.7% 3.9% 3.7% 3.7% 1.6% 2.4% 2.3% 2.2% 0.7% 0.6% 0.5%

Note: Excl. impacts of share-based compensation and other non-operating items

Source(s): the Group , ABCI Securities estimates


Based on improving gross margins and cost trends, we expect core net margin (excl. impacts of share-based compensation and other non-operating items) to rise to 2.3% by 2021E from 1.9% in 2019. This would result in a 32% CAGR in core net profit for 2019-2021E.

Exhibit 40: Margin outlook



Source(s): the Group, ABCI Securities estimates

Exhibit 41: Core net profit outlook



Source(s): the Group, ABCI Securities estimates



Earnings sensitivity

Overall, JD's profit outlook is highly sensitive to its future core net margin, which is still thin at 1.9% in 2019. A 50bp improvement in core net margin will increase its 2020E and 2021E core net profit by 26% and 21%.

Exhibit 42: Earnings sensitivity analysis

, ,	
Changes in 2020E core net profit	Changes in 2021E core net profit
26%	21%
21%	17%
15%	13%
10%	9%
5%	4%
-5%	-4%
-10%	-9%
-15%	-13%
-21%	-17%
-26%	-21%
	Changes in 2020E core net profit 26% 21% 15% 10% 5% -5% -10% -15% -21%

Source(s): ABCI Securities estimates


Lesson learnt from Amazon (AMZN US)

By analyzing Amazon's historical margin trend, we believe room for margin improvement for JD is still ample.


Amazon adopts a similar asset-heavy business model as JD with direct sales and in-house logistics facilities. It suffered from declining EBIT margin during 2012-14 due to ongoing investments in infrastructures. However, the situation has started to improve since 2015, with significant margin growth seen in subsequent years driven by economies of scale and ongoing business expansion into the service areas. In 2019, its EBIT margin was 5.2% vs. just 0.4% in 2014. Amazon's case suggests that margin could improve significantly once a company passes through the turnaround inflection point.

For JD, its EBIT margin has been in the range of -1.4% to -0.2% between 2015 and 2018. In 2019, it has begun to pass the turnaround inflection point with a positive EBIT margin of 0.9%, which resembles Amazon's situation in 2014. This implies significant margin potential over the next 3-5 years if JD follows Amazon's footstep with ongoing improvement in operating efficiency, economies of scale, and expansion into the service areas.





Source(s): the Group, ABCI Securities



Source(s): the Group, ABCI Securities

Exhibit 45: Quarterly financials (RMB mn)

	1Q18	2Q18	3Q18	4Q18	1Q19	2Q19	3Q19	4Q19
Net product	91,498	110,489	93,890	120,232	108,652	133,516	118,854	149,712
Net service	8,630	11,802	10,878	14,601	12,430	16,764	15,988	20,972
Net revenues	100,128	122,291	104,768	134,833	121,081	150,280	134,842	170,684
Cost of revenue	-85,970	-105,777	-88,659	-115,661	-102,897	-128,156	-114,729	-146,686
Gross profit	14,159	16,514	16,109	19,172	18,184	22,125	20,113	23,998
Fulfillment expenses	-7,173	-8,215	-7,761	-8,861	-8,064	-9,155	-8,755	-10,995
Marketing expenses	-3,492	-5,261	-4,132	-6,352	-3,940	-5,621	-4,447	-8,226
Technology & content expenses	-2,413	-2,781	-3,449	-3,502	-3,717	-3,726	-3,585	-3,592
General & admin expenses	-1,076	-1,291	-1,397	-1,396	-1,321	-1,356	-1,341	-1,472
Impairment of goodwill and intangible			-22					
asset					00		0.007	0.45
Gain on disposal					83		2,987	815
Non-GAAP operating profit	1,084	353	878	551	2,204	3,435	3,157	1,029
Profit from operations	4	-1034	-652	-939	1,226	2,266	4,973	529
Share of result of equity investees	-497	-260	-185	-171	-717	-304	-199	-518
Interest income	546	606	576	390	313	376	503	594
Interest expenses	-229	-240	-241	-145	-187	-155	-163	-220
Others, net	1,803	-1,186	3,429	-3,951	6,886	-1,199	-3,958	3,647
PBT	1,628	-2,114	2,927	-4,816	7,519	984	1,156	4,032
Income tax expenses PAT	-151	-163	-52	-61	-280	-439	-605	-479
	1,477	-2,277	2,876	-4,877	7,240	545	551	3,553
Minority interest	-48	-65	-124	-73	-80	-74	-62	-81
Minority interest - mezzanine		1	1	1	1		1	1
Net income	1,525	-2,212	3,000	-4,805	7,319	619	612	3,634
Non-GAAP net profit	1,047	478	1,184	750	3,294	3,559	3,086	811
YoY								
Net product	31%	29%	23%	20%	19%	21%	27%	25%
Net service	60%	51%	49%	46%	44%	42%	47%	44%
Group revenue growth (%)	33%	31%	25%	22%	21%	23%	29%	27%
EBIT growth (%)	-99%	157%	-230%	-41%	26541%	-433%	-863%	-156%
Net profit growth (%)	539%	345%	196%	429%	380%	-133%	-80%	-176%
Core profit growth (%)	-21%	-51%	-47%	67%	215%	645%	161%	8%
Margin								
Gross profit margin (%)	14.1%	13.5%	15.4%	14.2%	15.0%	14.7%	14.9%	14.1%
EBIT margin (%)	0.0%	-0.8%	-0.6%	-0.7%	1.0%	1.5%	3.7%	0.3%
Net margin (%)	1.5%	-1.8%	2.9%	-3.6%	6.0%	0.4%	0.5%	2.1%
Core net margin (%)	1.0%	0.4%	1.1%	0.6%	2.7%	2.4%	2.3%	0.5%

Source(s): the Group, ABCI Securities



Initiate with BUY

We initiate **BUY** on the counter with a SOTP-based TP of USD 49. We view JD as a quality play in the ecommerce sector given its direct sales business model and in-house logistic network.

For JD's core ecommerce business, we assess the value through the DCF approach to capture JD's long-term value since the Group is still in the process of improving its profitability.

Our DCF approach is based on the following assumptions:

- 11% WACC based on 2.6% risk free rate (reference to China 10-year government bond yield), 1.1x beta, 8.5% equity risk premium, 5% cost of debt and 10% debt to capital ratio
- 3% terminal growth rate
- EBIT margin normalized to 6% by 2029E
- 11% core ecommerce revenue CAGR in 2019-2029E

The following table shows the sensitivity analysis.

Exhibit 46: DCF sensitivity

				WACC		
		9%	10%	11%	12%	13%
	2.0%	41.6	38.7	36.1	33.8	31.6
Terminal						
growth	2.5%	43.2	40.2	37.4	34.9	32.7
	3.0%	44.9	41.7	38.9	36.3	33.9
	3.5%	46.9	43.6	40.5	37.8	35.3
	4.0%	49.1	45.6	42.4	39.5	36.8

Source: ABCI Securities estimates

For JD Logistics, we refer to its implied valuation in its latest refinancing round. For strategic investment, refer to its latest book value.

Our SOTP-based valuation range is USD45.7-USD54.2 per share. We set our TP to USD49, around the mid-point of this range.

Exhibit 47: SOTP-based valuation range (USD per share)

Segment	Low	Base	High	Comment
Core business	36.1	38.9	42.4	DCF –from 2% to 4% terminal growth rate
JD Logistics	6.8	7.5	8.3	From 10% discount to 10% premium of its 81% stake
Investments	2.8	3.2	3.5	Book value with 0-20% discount
Overall	45.7	49.6	54.2	

Source(s): ABCI Securities estimates



Peer valuation analysis

JD's comparable peers are major online e-commerce platforms including Alibaba and Pinduoduo. Among them, the market leader Alibaba is currently trading at 17.8x 2021E P/E. On the other hand, Pinduoduo, an emerging player, is currently trading at 35.1x 2021E P/E.

JD is currently trading at a higher P/E than Alibaba. In our view, this could be justified by its margin expansion momentum, which could lead to higher profit growth in coming years. In addition, as discussed above, as JD's profit outlook is highly sensitive to its margin trend; meaningful upside would emerge if margin improved more than expected.

Overall, our TP implies 0.96x 2019-21E PEG.

Exhibit 48: Peer valuation

		Market cap (Lcy)	Price (Lcy)	P/sales		P/E			PEG*	
				<u>2019E</u>	<u>2020E</u>	<u>2021E</u>	<u>2019E</u>	<u>2020E</u>	<u>2021E</u>	<u>20-21E</u>
BABA US Equity	ALIBABA	496,572	185.1	6.8	5.2	4.2	25.9	22.6	17.8	0.9
JD US Equity	JD.COM	55,866	38.3	0.7	0.6	0.5	31.9	29.9	19.8	0.7
PDD US Equity	PINDUODUO	38,137	32.8	8.8	5.7	3.9	NA	NA	35.1	NA
				5.4	3.8	2.9	28.9	26.2	24.3	0.8

^{*}PEG=2021E PE/core profit CAGR 2019-21E Source(s): Bloomberg, ABCI Securities estimates




Risk factors

Market competition

The Group competes with other online ecommerce platforms including Alibaba and Pinduoduo. The competition will be on commission rate, promotion discount, brand advertising, technological investment, and more.

Pinduoduo has been experiencing rapid growth in recent years, with its active users reaching 536mn in Sep 2019 vs. 68mn in 1Q17. Its number of active users have exceeded that of JD since 2Q18. Overall, Pinduoduo has been particularly popular in lower-tier cities due to heavy promotion discounts.



Source(s): Companies, ABCI Securities

Slowing ecommerce consumption

As the Group is exposed to consumer spending on services, any significant slowdown of consumption in China would impact financial performance. In the long term, we believe domestic market growth would converge with income growth, which is usually in line with GDP growth.

No dividend record to ordinary shareholders

The Group has omitted dividend to ordinary shareholders since listing. In our view, this could due to its weak profitability over the past few years. Having said that, the situation might changes in the medium term should its profitability continue to improve over the next few years driven by ongoing margin expansion.




Non-GAAP financials

The Group has disclosed the non-GAAP financial metrics, such as the non-GAAP net profit, to supplement its GAAP financial measures. Historically, there were significant differences between its GAAP net profit and non-GAAP net profit due to inclusion of items such as share-based compensation, impairment, fair valuation changes of investment, and disposal gains of asset in the former.

Among these items, share-based compensation expense is related to various factors including price movement of ordinary shares, expected volatility, risk-free interest rate, etc. JD's share-based compensation expenses have been trending up over the past few years, rising from RMB 1.1bn in 2015 to RMB 3.7bn in 2019.

While investors tend to exclude these items when performing analysis given their non-cash nature, we believe these non-GAAP financial measures should only serve as reference.



Source(s): the Group, ABCI Securities



Consolidated income statement (2018A-2021E)

FY Ended Dec 31 (RMB mn)	2018A	2019A	2020E	2021E
Net product revenue	416,109	510,734	582,538	688,122
Net service revenue	45,911	66,154	86,427	109,731
Total revenue	462,019	576,888	668,965	797,852
Cost of sales	-396,066	-492,467	-568,642	-677,396
Gross profit	65,953	84,421	100,323	120,457
Fulfillment expenses	-32,010	-36,968	-41,934	-49,109
Marketing expenses	-19,237	-22,234	-25,778	-29,913
Technology & content expenses	-12,144	-14,619	-15,284	-17,27
General & admin expenses	-5,182	-5,490	-4,773	-4,51
Gains on disposal	0	3,885	0	, · · (
Operating Profits	-2,619	8,995	12,554	19,649
nterest income	-1,113	-1,738	-1,600	-1,600
nterest expenses	2,118	1,786	1,600	1,65
Share of results of equity investees	-855	-725	-850	-90
Others, net	95	5,375	100	10
PBT	-2,374	13,693	11,804	18,89
-ax	-427	-1,802	-2,058	-3,36
PAT	-2,801	11,890	9,746	15,53
Ainority interests	-309	-293	-250	-25
Profits attributable to shareholders	-2,492	12,184	9,996	15,78
Share-based compensation	3,660	3,695	2,163	1,89
mortization	1,806	885	1,338	1,59
mpairment/FV changes of investments	808	-745	0	.,00
Other non-core items	-321	-5,269	-449	-65
Non-GAAP profits attributable to shareholders	3,460	10,750	13,049	18,62
Growth				
Total revenue (%)	27.5	24.9	16	19.
Gross Profits (%)	29.8	28	18.8	20.
Operating Profits (%)	213.8	-443.4	39.6	56.
let profit (%)	-2,239.30	-588.8	-18	57.
Non-GAAP net profit (%)	-30.4	210.7	21.4	42.
Operating performance				
Operating margin (%)	-0.6	1.6	1.9	2.
let margin (%)	-0.5	2.1	1.5	
Core net margin (%)	0.7	1.9	2	2.
ROAE (%)	-4.4	16.7	10.9	14.

Note: Individual items may not sum to total due to rounding Source(s): the Group, ABCI Securities estimates



Consolidated balance sheet (2018A-2021E)

As of Dec 31 (RMB mn)	2018A	2019A	2020E	2021E
Fixed assets	38,112	37,352	53,852	70,352
Investments	47,258	56,993	56,993	56,993
Other non-current assets	18,939	26,284	29,184	32,084
Total non-current assets	104,309	120,629	140,028	159,428
Cash & equivalents	37,502	39,912	39,131	44,734
Short-term investments and investment securities	2,036	24,603	24,603	24,603
Inventories	44,030	57,932	64,445	76,770
Account receivables	11,110	6,191	25,659	30,603
Other current assets	10,178	10,457	10,457	10,457
Total current assets	104,855	139,094	164,294	187,165
Total assets	209,164	259,723	304,322	346,594
Account payables	93,003	106,507	137,596	160,837
Borrowings and notes	4,545	0	0	0
Other current liabilities	23,314	33,510	33,510	33,510
Total current liabilities	120,862	140,017	171,106	194,347
Payables & accruals	309	226	226	226
Borrowings and notes	9,874	10,052	10,052	10,052
Other non-current liabilities	1,291	8,805	8,805	8,805
Total non-current liabilities	11,474	19,082	19,082	19,082
Total liabilities	132,336	159,099	190,188	213,429
Mezzanine equity	15,961	15,964	15,961	15,961
Equity attributable to shareholders	59,771	81,856	95,616	114,897
Non-controlling interests	1,096	2,804	2,554	2,304
Total equity	60,866	84,660	98,169	117,201

Notes: Individual items may not sum to total due to rounding

Individual items may vary from reported figures due to rounding /definition differences

Source(s): the Group, ABCI Securities estimates



Consolidated cash flow statement (2018A-2021E)

As of Dec 31 (RMB mn)	2018A	2019A	2020E	2021E
Operating cash flow	20,881	24,782	19,110	24,631
Investing cash flow	-26,078	-25,349	-25,000	-25,000
Financing cash flow	11,220	2,573	-	-
Effective of FX	1,681	405	-	-
Net cash flows	7,704	2,410	-5,890	-369

Notes: Individual items may not sum to total due to rounding

Individual items may vary from reported figures due to rounding /definition differences

Source(s): the Group, ABCI Securities estimates



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Definition of equity rating

Rating	Definition
Buy	Stock return rate ≥ Market return rate (10%)
Hold	- Market return rate (-10%) ≤ Stock return rate < Market return rate (+10%)
Sell	Stock return < - Market return (-10%)

Notes: Stock return rate: expected percentage change of share price plus gross dividend yield over the next 12 months Market return rate: average market return rate since 2008 (HSI total return index 2008-19 CAGR at 10%)

Time horizon of share price target: 12-month

Stock rating, however, may vary from the stated framework due to factors including but not limited to: corporate governance, market capitalization, historical price volatility relative to corresponding benchmark index, average daily turnover of the stock relative to market capitalization of the stock, competitive advantages in corresponding industry, etc.

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